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This study provides a stylized model on “Exit, voice and loyalty” as alternative strategic 
responses taken by Kenyan green beans farmers in the context of new and more stringent 
international  food  safety  standards.  On  the  analytical  side,  we  use  the  Nash  bargaining 
theory where the exporter and a representative grower bargain over the product quality level 
and the premium producer price. The comparative statics analysis shows that the producer 
bargaining power unlike the compliance costs has, ceteris paribus, a positive effect on the 
equilibrium quality level while these exogenous variables have ambiguous effects on producer 
price at equilibrium. Empirical results from logit model estimation with survey data at farm-
level in Kenya show that households with highly educated members, access to credit and 
relatively large-size farms are more likely to participate in the certified supply chain. Off-
farm income, live assets and distance of public services from the farm do not influence the 
compliance.  In  terms  of  policy  implications,  education  and  credit  access  could  play  an 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Developed countries food safety standards (DCFSS) are becoming a more prominent issue for 
global trade in agricultural and food products (Henson and Jaffe, 2008). Food safety scandals 
and  the  ensuing  consumer  concerns  with  food  contamination  by  microorganisms  and 
pesticides in the European Union (EU) over the past decade have led governments to enact 
stringent food safety regulations (Jaffee, 2003; Mungai, 2004 in Okello, 2006). Beside these 
mandatory  regulations,  supermarkets  adopted  voluntary  private  standards  which  are  even 
more stringent and beyond the world trade organization (WTO) scope. Private standards such 
those of GlobalGAP pursue a mix of goals covering consumer confidence in food quality and 
safety, market transparency, social and environmental issues, etc. (Baghasa, 2008). 
The governance of international food safety standards (IFSS) becomes particularly interesting 
when  the  export  supply  chain  involves  developing  countries  producers  and  developed 
countries  retailers.  Large  retailers  in  Europe  play  an  important  role  in  structuring  the 
production and processing of fresh vegetables exported from Africa (Dolan and Humphrey, 
2001).  In  such  situation,  supermarkets  pass  their  requirements  to  foreign  suppliers  via 
importers and exporters. However, there is a concern emerging through the literature that less 
efficient farmers could be marginalized and excluded from the export supply business. Small-
scale  farmers  who  do  not  attain  economies  of  scale  could  be  the  first  victims  of  the 
development of stricter food safety standards in developed countries markets.  
This study focuses more specifically on private standards prevailing in United Kingdom (UK) 
supermarkets that source their green beans essentially from Kenya. Before 1990, the major 
quality concerns for Kenyan growers were physical attributes of green beans such as size, 
shape and spotlessness that were easily met by applying large quantities of pesticides without 
adequate protection Okado (2001) in Okello (2006). After 1990, however, the green beans 
export  supply  is  strongly  regulated  and  the  share  of  small-scale  growers  is  declining. 
According to Kimenye (1994) in Okello and Sindi (2006) smallholders contributed to more 
than 70 percent of green bean production in the early 1990s. Recently, they account for less 
than 40 percent of green beans grown for fresh export market (Jaffee, 2003).  
The  study  addresses  the  following  research  question.  How  small-scale  farms  are  being 
excluded from the green beans exports supply? In other words, what are the determinants of 
small-scale farms decision-making on their participation in export supply to UK supermarkets 
versus alternative markets with less stringent requirements? We hypothesize that when the 
IFSS become more stringent, only growers of high efficiency remain in the export supply. In 
other words, the size of compliant group decreases with the stringency of food standards. 
We first provide an analytical stylized model using the Nash bargaining theory to understand 
the  decision-making  phenomenon  at  farm-level.  The  analytical  model  is  followed  by  an 
empirical exercise made not to test the entire analytical model but rather to understand what 
represent the unobservable producer’s efficiency that is governing the participation of the 
small-scale  farm  in  certified  product  channel  versus  alternative  markets.  Moreover,  the 
analytical framework is based on ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ as alternative strategic responses 
developed Hirschman (1970). We assume that compliance and exit are alternative outcomes 
following  the  voice  process.  Moreover  we  take  into  account  the  fact  that  these  strategic 
responses  could  be adopted proactively  versus reactively according to  Henson and Jaffee 
(2008) and the World Bank (2005). 
The  Hirschman’s  framework  was  initially  developed  to  examine  economic  and  political 
behaviour as responses to the decline in firms, organizations and states but has been since 
extended to different contexts. In agricultural applied studies, Henson and Jaffee (2008) and 
the World Bank (2005) highlight the exit, voice and loyalty concepts at international levels   3 
and dress the factors that influence the availability and choice of strategic options. Okello 
(2006) uses the ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ or ‘compliance’ concepts in his study on strategic 
responses adopted by Kenyan smallholder family green beans farms. Moreover, many other 
empirical studies are made on the determinants and impacts of participation of small farmers 
in supermarkets versus traditional markets (Hernández et al, 2006) and on the adoption of 
private standards (Asfaw et al, 2007).  At our knowledge however, there is no analytical and 
empirical study on exit, voice and loyalty applied to agricultural and food products’ supply.  
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 dresses the historical context of 
green  bean  supply  chain  in  Kenya  regarding  the  emergence  of  international  food  safety 
standards and the strategic responses adopted accordingly at farm-level. Section 3 develops 
the analytical model. Section 4 presents and discusses empirical results while section 5 brings 
the concluding remarks.   
2 KENYAN GREEN BEANS EXPORT SUPPLY, EMERGENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL FOOD STANDARDS AND FARMERS’ STRATEGIC 
RESPONSES 
According to Jaffee (1990) in Jaffee (2003) 14,500 smallholder farmers were participating in 
the fresh produce export trade in the mid-1980s.  About 7,000 of them grew beans, Asian 
vegetables  or  other  vegetables  for  export,  while  the  remaining  7,500  grew  mangoes, 
avocadoes  or  other  fruits  which  were  exported.  At  that  time,  it  was  estimated  that 
smallholders  accounted  for  45  percent  of  the  volume  of  export  vegetables  and  about  50 
percent of the combined export volume for fruit and vegetables. Kimenye (1994) in Okello 
and Sindi (2006) indicates that smallholders contributed to more that 70 percent of green bean 
production in the early 1990s. This dominance of smallholders has since changed. Recent 
studies  (Dolan  and  Humprey,  1999  and  2000;  Jaffee,  2003)  show  that  the  share  of 
smallholders has diminished while that of large-scale growers has risen. Jaffee (2003) suggest 
that small-scale family farms currently account for less than 40 percent of green beans grown 
for fresh export market.  
The decline in the share of small-scale family farms is largely attributed to the challenges 
posed by DCFSS which were developed to address the food safety scandals of the 1980s and 
1990s. Indeed, 1990 could be taken as the “baseline” situation of the fresh produce industry. 
In the pre-DCFSS era, the major quality concerns were physical attributes of green beans such 
as size, shape and spotlessness. These physical attributes were easily met by applying large 
quantities of pesticides without adequate protection Okado (2001) in Okello (2006).  
Since 1990, significant events in external regulatory environment take place.  Jaffee (2003) 
underlines that Food safety Act in United Kingdom (UK), EU directive on pesticide residues 
and EU directive on food hygiene were developed in 1990 while EU Harmonized Framework 
of Pesticides was initiated in 1993. Other well-known regulations like Euro-Retailer Produce 
Working Group-Good Agricultural practises (EUREPGAP) actual known as GlobalGAP, the 
British Retailer Consortium (BRC) food technical standard were created in the mid 1990s. 
Actually, a mix of both public and private standards set at national and international levels 
makes a pressure on Kenyan growers and exporters. 
Hence,  in  this  context  of  evolving  regulatory  external  environment,  strategic  responses 
emerge from suppliers of exportable greens beans.  Indeed, complying with DCFSS requires 
human, physical and social capital that is not always available to small grower. The latter may 
exit, that  is, abandon the green beans business and switch to  markets with  less  stringent 
requirements or other commodities if he fails to comply. Some small growers succeed to 
comply with DCFSS by forming farmers’ groups to overcome idiosyncratic market failure 
and attain economies of scale (Okello, 2006). Moreover farmers organized in groups can   4 
voice or lobby the government to provide the facilities needed to meet EU FSS. The next 
section provides the analytical development of voice using a bargaining theory. We assume 
that exit and loyalty are alternative outcomes of a voice process hereby understood as a Nash 
bargaining process.  
3. THE ANALYTICAL MODEL 
We conceptualise a Nash bargaining problem where Kenyan green beans growers organised 
into  groups  and  exporter  bargain  over  the  producer  price  and  the  quality  level  of  the 
exportable product to UK supermarkets. We define first utility function for each actor before 
defining the Nash bargaining product whose maximisation yields the optimal producer price 
and optimal quality level. The model considers only small-scale farms of less than one hectare 
according the definition of Okello et al. (2007).  Green beans growers react to DCFSS and 
especially UK supermarkets requirements according to household’s assets. We assume also 
that the exporter himself reflects to growers the UK supermarket requirements. We know 
from Dolan and Humphrey (2000) that there other actors in the export supply chain such as 
importers,  retailers  and  consumers.  We  assume  they  are  not  directly  involved  in  the 
bargaining process between growers and exporters. 
3.1. Pay-offs of the players 
We follow Fontaine et al. (2008) in specifying the utility function of the players. Assume that 
the exporter is a delegate of UK supermarket. We assume that the buyer-exporter X buys 
green beans from grower g for a price  g P and sells them to consumers for a unitary price c P . 
The price received by the producer is taken as a premium price to remunerate the quality 
levelθ  of his product.  As shown in Fontaine et al. (2008), ( ) q P C − = 1 θ ; the exporter utility 
function 
c
x U  in contract is then given by ( ) g g c
c
x P q P P U − − = − = 1 θ .   (1)  
Let  0 =
o
x U be the utility of the exporter outside the contract, in order words, his margins 
when bargaining fails. We don’t know much about 
o
x U  but it is off course lower than the 
utility  under contract.  If the bargaining  process fails indeed, the  supermarket  could loose 
customers who will switch to other stores. This could be the case when products are not 
available at the time they go shopping (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). Supermarkets could then 
bear additional transaction costs to identify other SMOs ready to contract and then ensure 
reliability of supply. However, in this study we consider a cooperative bargaining case and 
then set the exit option to zero. In other words both actors gain more if they stay both, farmers 
who voice or bargain then comply with DCFSS. 
On the supply side, we consider farmers organised into groups. When they are able to comply 
with the DCFSS, they are linked to the exporter through a contract specifying the volume of 
supply, the quality of product, the price to receive and the related calendar. Moreover, their 
agricultural operations are monitored by exporter or his delegate. If not, they sell their product 
in alternative less demanding markets such as domestic or Asian markets. However, suppliers 
of high quality product must bear additional costs named costs of compliance to DCFSS. The 
large share of these costs is fixed costs that relate to physical infrastructures (charcoal cooler, 
grading shed …) that could be shared through collective action (Okello, 2006). Moreover, 
high costs of monitoring individual smallholder farmers will motivate the exporter to contract 
with  smallholder  farmers  groups  or  associations  rather  than  individual  growers  (Okello, 
2006).    5 
Following Fontaine et al. (2008), the pay-off 
c
g U of a contracting-grower organised in group 




g − − − − − =
+ 1 1
1 θ  with  0 ; 0 ; 0 > − > > d c d c       (2) 
The  parameter  ais  exacerbates  changes  inθ   and  is  such  that 1 > a ,  i  is  a  production 
efficiency  parameter
1.  Producers  with  1 = i are  likely  to  remain  in  green  bean  business. 
Indeed, in theses conditions, it does not cost anything to supply quality levelθ . In contrast, 
the more  i tends to0, the more it is costly to produce the quality level required. Producers 
with  such  characteristic  are  very  likely  to  exit  high  demanding  markets  such  as  UK 
supermarkets. The parameter crepresents the cost of certification for the producer group, d  is 
the slope of the compliance costs curve and ( ) i − 1  is the size of the contracting group within 
which the compliance cost is shared. It is also assumed that every compliant grower supplies 
only 1 unity of the product. 
In this analysis however we modify the original utility function adopted by Fontaine et al, 
(2008). We make the specification less complex to provide a solution to the Nash bargaining 
problem. We adopt a simple utility function decreasing in compliance costs and increasing in 
the size of compliant group. This means that compliance borne by a producer in a group of 
compliant growers decrease when the size of group increases as highlighted in figure 1. The 
above  curve  is  the  ideal  specification  adopted  by  Fontaine  et  al.  (2008)  unfortunately  it 
provides a cumbersome solution in ( ) i − 1 that is very hard to work out in this case. To provide 
a solution to the bargaining process, we adopt instead a simple linear decreasing function of 
compliance costs in the size of the compliant group (curve below). Particularly, when there is 











Farmers  organised  into  groups  without  complying  with  UK  supermarket  food  safety 
standards, will not be obliged to bear high investment in quality. However, they will miss the 
premium price offered in high quality product market channel and still support the cost of the 
collective action. They will instead obtain a price  O P  lower than g P of alternative markets. For 
the same reasons of a cooperative bargaining, we set to zero the exit option, that is, the 
producer utility outside the contract  0 =
o
g U  
                                                
1 Fontaine et al. (2008) find that the parameter  a must be higher than one to solve for price and quantity of 
equilibrium from demand and supply curves intersection. 
( ) i − 1  
c 
c-d 
0  1 






Figure 1: Relation between compliance costs and the size of the compliant group  
compliance 
costs   6 
Logically, a given farmer produces under contract if the expected utility exceeds the margins 
outside the contract. In order words, farmer will contract with an exporter if: 
( ) ( ) 0 1 1
1 ≥ − + − − − =




g θ  where i is the type of producer who is indifferent to 
supply the certified product or produce for less demanding markets. 












                  (3) 
There is a unique equilibrium for the compliant group or the quantity produced. Moreover, 
this equilibrium is stable as the compliant group increases with the premium but decreases 
with compliance costs and the product quality level. Indeed, ceteris paribus, an increasing 
producer price is attractive to growers who will decide to be monitored and contract to supply 
the  required  quality  product.  However  when  the  total  compliance  costs  or  the  quality 
standards go up less efficient growers exit the green beans business. In situation of economies 





























































.   
However, as the grower efficiency ranges between 0 and 1 depends on the type of grower, it is 
relevant to use in the Nash product, one value ofi, for example the median or the mean value 
which is the  half  of the size of compliant group  that is, 
2
1 i −
;  this assumption leads the 









+ = . 
The payoffs of the players in the contract become respectively:  



































θ θ           (4) 
3.2. Analytical results 
We can now construct the Nash bargaining product (NBP)Ωas follows: 














g U P U U P U .  Ωis then the function to optimize with respect to  
the  premium price  g P  and the product quality level θ ,  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ β is the bargaining power of a 
grower  pertaining  to  a  supplier  market  organization  (SMO)  while β − 1 is  the  bargaining 
power  of  the  buyer-exporter.  The  unique  Nash  solution  ( )
* *,θ p P maximizes  the  Nash 
bargaining product. We assume it satisfies the four axioms of Nash (1950). 
























































Log P         (5)   7 
The solution satisfies two conditions of maximization. The first derivate is null while the 
second is negative.   
From the first-order condition (F.O.C) of maximization of NBP w.r.t to the producer price we 













* 1                (6) 
Moreover, the second-order condition (SOC) to the maximization process with respect to g P  
is obviously satisfied:  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )





















g g P c P d
d
c P P θ θ θ θ
θ θ β β
        (7) 
The solution in θ is more complex to establish. Even for
*
g P , it is not possible to make direct 
comparative  static  analysis  as  the  premium  price  is  still  expressed  into  the  endogenous 
variable quality level. To deal with this situation we have to use the implicit function theorem. 
We follow Ferrier (2003) to apply the theorem on the FOC of the NBP maximization w.r.t. to 
the quality level:  
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d c P F
a g θ θ θ
βθ β
θ θ
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. The denominator is always negative because it is the SOC to the NBP 
maximization. 
Producers with high bargaining power are empowered enough to supply a product of required 
quality. Indeed, the bargaining power of suppliers increases when they are well organised. 
They become more likely to supply high quality and are in the same time in good position to 
negotiate with the exporter on quality issues. On the other hand however, one can think that 
producers with high or enough bargaining power can easily voice anticipatively and reject 
rigorous or more stringent than necessary requirements. In this case, bargaining power should 
undermine quality level. 
We make likewise the comparative statics analysis on the quality level at equilibrium with 











































dF         (10) 
The sign of the differential in relation (10) is clearly positive as the numerator is positive 
while the denominator is the SOC to the NBP maximization. This means that to meet high 
quality standards need to bear important compliance costs and vice-versa.   8 
As  we  are  interested  in  compliance  within  farmers’  groups,  it  is  better  to  compute  to 
following derivate: 




















































  (11) 
When  the  average  fixed  costs  increase  (decrease)  the  equilibrium  quality  level  decreases 
(increases).  It can be expected that when costs of compliance are increasingly high, suppliers 
will struggle hardly to provide a product of a required quality, sometimes they will be unable 
to  do  so.  In  their  welfare-analysis  on  the  effects  of  certification  costs  on  quality  level, 
Fontaine et al. (2008) nuance that when producers share the certification costs, an increase in 
certification cost may induce a decrease in their optimal quality level, which diminishes the 
optimal quality for the society as a whole. 
In extending this comparative static analysis to
*
g P , we have to take into account both direct 
and indirect effects from the equilibrium producer price relationship on one hand and the 
implicit function  F where θ is expected to be expressed in exogenous parametersβ  andC on 
the other hand. In doing so, we have:  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )








































































    (12)  
The first term of the differential in relation (12) has a positive sign. The entire differential is 
unambiguously signed if the second term is also positive. Assuming that 1 = a , the sign (12) is 
positive if  d c 2 1 1 0 + + + − ≤ <θ  and if d 2 0 < <θ . Under these conditions, an increase (a 
decrease) in the producer bargaining power implies an increase (a decrease) in the equilibrium 
producer price. In such situation, we expect that when producers are in a good position to 
negotiate with the buyer-exporter, they are likely to get an interesting remuneration. Without 
these assumptions, we are not able to say how the producer bargaining power does affect the 
equilibrium producer price. 
 To determine how an increase or a decrease in compliance costs does affect the producer 
price, we compute the following differentials:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) dc
d
d
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  (13) 
The first and the second terms of the differential of relation (13) are both positive. The sign of 
the entire differential cannot be signed unambiguously because we don’t know exactly when 
the third term is positive.    9 
( ) ( )
( )
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   (14) 
   
Once again, the entire differential of relation (14) cannot be signed unambiguously despite the 
assumption 1 = a . Indeed, the first term is negative and the second factor of the second term is 
also negative. The first factor of the second term must be positive to yield a negative sign to 
the overall differential. This could be so if  d c 2 1 1 + + + − > θ but as 0 < + − d c , the overall 
sign is unknown. One can however expect that bearing high compliance costs could lead to 
the supply of a high quality but this could not be always the case. A less efficient grower 
could  face  high  compliance  costs  without  getting  necessary  best  prices.  Moreover,  when 
compliance costs are increasingly high, growers must struggle much or sometimes they could 
fail to supply the required quality, then they miss the premium price. 
 
We  can  also  extend  the  comparative  statics  analysis  to  the  technical  parameterathat 
influences the costliness of supplying a high quality product.  Indeed the parameter  acan be 
included in the implicit function as an additional exogenous variable. Then, we can compute 
as above the following differentials: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
*
2 1 * * *






























    (15) 
The sign of this differential is only determined by the numerator while the denominator is the 
SOC  to  the  NBP  maximization  with  respect  to  quality  level.  The  sign  will  be  positive 
when 1





; in this case, the technical parameter a and the equilibrium quality level 
vary in the same direction. Otherwise, the differential is ambiguously signed.  
Likewise, the total effect of the technical parameter  aon the equilibrium producer price is 
assessed through the following differential: 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) da
d
d
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The  first  term  is  positively  signed  if  1





.  All  what  we  have 
developed till now relates to the proactive behaviour where growers lobby governments to 
voice internationally and anticipate the standards by voice. Quid the reactive behaviour where 
growers face a “take-it leave-it situation” with standards set unilaterally by the supermarkets? 
In this situation, the Nash bargaining product is reduced to the sole utility of the exporter as 
the  producer  bargaining  power  is  equal  to  zero  while  that  of  the  buyer-exporter  is  at  its 
maximum. Unfortunately there is no solution for the equilibrium producer price while that of 
product  quality  level  is  still  complex.  We  cannot  in  such  situation  construct  an  implicit   10 
function to make the required comparative statics analysis. Because of the adjustment made 
on compliance costs in the producer utility function, we are unable to deal with this particular 
case of reactive strategic response from farmers. 
In the following section, we specify an empirical model to discover factors that influence the   
efficiency parameter iof the green bean grower. Essentially, the efficiency is reflected in the 
farm characteristics which affect the decision taken by growers of green beans to supply or 
not certified green beans. 
4 EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS   
4.1Empirical model 
In this section we use survey data collected by Okello of Nairobi University on 181 green 
bean smallholders at farm-level. From the analytical development, we know variables that 
influence the supply of certified product. The utility to participate in a contract increases with 
the producer price and the producer bargaining power and decreases with compliance costs. A 
compliant  farmer  signs  a  contract  and  his  agricultural  operations  are  monitored.  A  non-
compliant  supplies  freely  alternative  markets.  Then  our  dependent  variable  Contract is 
qualitative and could be modelled according a logit model which is less complicated to work 




i i u X Contract + + = ∑
=1
0 β β                 (17) 
Where  i Contract is  the  kind  of  contract  adopted  by  each  green  bean  grower,  i X are 
explanatory variables, while  i u  is the disturbance. The explanatory variables are demographic 
(i)  households  characteristics  (age,  gender,  education  level,  household  size,  etc.),  assets 
holding  and  household  wealth  (land  size,  livestock  ownership,  both  farm  and  off-farm 
incomes, type of agricultural assets (ox-plough, oxen, sprayer, bathroom, grading shed, etc.), 
(iii) access to services (credit, dispensaries, irrigation, training, markets, etc.) and (iv) price 
incentives (price of fine and extra fine green beans).  
The probability of signing a contract  ( ) 1 Pr = = i i Contract P  in a logistic model is expressed as 



































































































ln β β               (18) 













ln Where  the  qualitative  dependent  variable  isCONTRACT that  takes  the 
value 1 when the household is involved in green beans business through a contract and 0 
otherwise. All the explanatory variables are listed and defined in table 2.   11 
4.2 Results and discussion 
Based on the t-statistic computed by using the central limit theorem on population means 
(table 2a), we realize that monitored households’ heads are in average slightly older (years 
39.687) than unmonitored (years 37.494). There no however any significant difference related 
to household head’s education or highest level of education in the household. The monitored 
households have the advantage to have the largest plot sizes (acres 0.545) comparatively to 
unmonitored households (acres 0.465). That’s why they produce also more than two times the 
quantities of fine and extra fine beans got by unmonitored farmers (Kg 315.4 and Kg 658 
against Kg 223.6 and Kg 287 respectively). However, monitored households are not better 
endowed in farm size than unmonitored. Moreover, no any significant difference is observed 
between these two kinds of households in terms of main assets. 
Surprisingly, unmonitored households get the highest prices for both fine and extra fine beans, 
respectively Ksh 43.653 and Ksh 46.838 per kilogram against Ksh 28.831 and Ksh 38.444 per 
kilogram for monitored households
2. Figure 2 highlights the relative importance the mains 
reasons evoked in supplying certified product.  
Table 1 
Definition of variables used in the model 































Dummy variable =1 when the households produces under contract and 0 
otherwise 
 
The age in years the household’s head 
The gender of the household’s head (=1 for male and = 0 otherwise) 
The education level of household’s head in years spent to school 
The highest education level in the household 
 
The size of the farm in acres 
The size in acres of the plot of green beans 
The yield of fine beans in Kg/acres 
The yield of extra fine beans Kg/acres 
A dummy equals 1 if farmer has an ox-plough, oxen or tractor 
A dummy equals 1 if farmer has a chemical store or a grading shed 
Total revenue from beans  
 
Price of fine beans in Kshs/Kg 
Price of extra fine beans in Kshs/Kg 
 
Distance of the nearest market from the farm in walking minutes 
Distance of the nearest bean collection centre from the farm in walking 
minutes 
Distance of the nearest dispensary from the farm in walking minutes 
Dummy variable = 1 if the household receives an agricultural credit and  
0 otherwise 
The amount received in Kshs as agricultural credit 
 
Dummy  variable=1  if  the  household  keeps  records  of  his  farm 
operations for the last crop; =0 if not  
                                                
2 Either the variance of prices under and outside the contract does not differ significantly. The related chi-square 
test statistic is 59.18 and 19.23 respectively for extra fine and fine beans.    12 
We notice that the main reason that leads farmers to conclude a contract with exporter is to 
get an assured market (60.8%) in order to protect their investments. The size of farmers who 
expect to get stable prices is about 13.5% while those who hope to get high prices through 
contract represents only 12.36%. 
Unstable prices are a considerable concern. Even in formal contracts, Okello and Sindi (2007) 
using the principal-agent theory, underscore that the contract will induce the buyer to share 
risks (from opportunistic behaviour and market price) with the farmer(s) by paying variable 
prices. Further, price could vary because of brokers’ activities (Okello and Sindi, 2007). Out 
of the contract, the price varies more substantially. It can rise to six times higher especially in 
the period of high demand for beans in the United Kingdom. Non compliant farmers target 
then such periods. This explains why the mean price could be higher out of the contract than 
in contract. Another possible explanation of lower prices in contracts could the fact monitored 
some households are still paying the loan received from the buyer-exporter. Farmers pay the 
loan with the price they receive.  
Table 2a 
Descriptive statistics and test statistic on means of continuous explanatory 
variables 
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*,**,*** denote statistical significance at 0.10; 0.05 and 0.001 probability level respectively 
 
 On  the  other  hand,  we  do  not  find  significant  differences  between  monitored  and 
unmonitored  households  in  terms  of  access  to  services.  Indeed,  the  average  distance  in 
walking minutes of the nearest market, bean collection or dispensary from the farm is roughly 
the  same  whether  or  not  the farm  produces  under  contract.  However,  there  is  significant 
difference  in  the  amount  of  credit  received  by  monitored  (Ksh  10,969)  and  unmonitored 
households (Ksh 952.5).  




























Figure 2. Relative importance of the main first reasons for producing under contract 
 
Table 2b presents the results on t-test of Chi-square cumulative distribution function using 
frequencies on discrete variables. The main significant difference between unmonitored and 
monitored households relates to access to credit where the test statistic (57.347) is greater 
than
2
001 . 0 χ  with a degree of freedom equals 1. Mechanization is significant at 0.10 probability 
level respectively.  
Table 3 reports the results of a logit estimation of the dependent dummy variable on selected 
continuous and discrete explanatory variables. Producer price for both fine and extra fine 
beans are withdrawn because they are determined by the bargaining process, they do not 
reflect the producer efficiency.  
Table 2b 
Descriptive  statistics  and  chi-square  test  analysis  on  variances  of  discrete  explanatory 
variables  
Monitored households 
(n = 96) 
Unmonitored households  
(n = 85) 
 
 














































































































Legend: ** denotes statistical significance at 0.05 level of probability   14 
The log likelihood provides the significance of the logit model, suggesting that a relationship 
exits  between  the  probabilities  of  producing  under  contract  the  suggested  explanatory 
variables. Further, the model correctly predicts 80% (140 out of 175) of the responses. Only 
five affect significantly at 10% level the probability of producing under contract: the age of 
the household head (age), the size of the plot of green beans (plot size), the yield of fine beans 
(yield_fine_beans) and extra-fine beans (yield_extra_fine_beans) and the dummy of access to 
agricultural credit (credit_dummy).  
The access to agricultural credit plays the most important role in explaining the likelihood of 
supplying green bean under contracts. Farmers who access to credit are 31.01% more likely to 
adopt  a  contract.  Such  result  is  easily  understandable  and  there  is  a  strong  expectation 
concerning  the  sign  of  this  variable.  Farmers  in  developing  countries  face  indeed  severe 
capital  constraints.    Accessing  to  credit  drops  these  constraints  and  enables  quality 
investments required to comply with DCFSS. Here, there is no risk of endogeneity bias as the 
more important source of credit is the farmers group even though in some cases, the exporter 
can also provide a credit to finance the purchase of inputs. 
The age of the household’ head positively affects the decision of the household to produce 
under contract even though its marginal effect (0.5%) is slightly low. There is no strong prior 
expectation concerning the sign of this variable. However, old farmers might be more willing 
to produce under contract than younger ones, considering that age reflects experience and 
enough knowledge on market requirements. Old farmers could have also sufficiently invested 
in green beans business and are then more likely to bargain to safeguard their investments.  
The plot size of green beans positively influences the likelihood to adopt contract. Farmers 
with larger green beans plots are 16.20% more likely to produce under contract. According to 
Okello  and  Swinton  (2007),  volume  of  green  beans,  price,  quality  level  and  calendar 
scheduling the delivery plan are key elements mentioned in written contract. It is expected 
that growers with large size of plots will be more ready to meet the volume required by the 
contract.  
The yield of fine beans and especially that of extra-fine beans are also significantly positive. 
However their marginal effects of 0.008 and 0.02% respectively are very low. Farmers with 
high yield have also high profits than their neighbours facing low yields. They are able to 
support investments such improved seeds, new and expensive pesticides, chemical fertilisers, 
etc.  However,  there  could  be  a  possible  endogeneity  bias  vis-à-vis  this  variable.  Indeed, 
monitored  households  could  get  high  yields  because  of  training  and  extension  services 
provided under contract.    15 
Table 3 
 Logit estimation results for CONTRACT adoption 
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Legend: *;**;*** denote statistical significance at 0.10; 0.05 and 0.001 probability level respectively 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This  paper  is  built  on  two  complementary  analytical  and  empirical  approaches.  In  the 
analytical model, we have considered that compliance with private food standards follows a 
kind of voice, here understood as a cooperative and bilateral Nash bargaining process. The 
main results from the comparative statics analysis show that bargaining power has a positive 
effect  on  the  quality  level  for  some  specific  values  of  other  exogenous  parameters.  The 
average costs have a negative effect on the quality level while these exogenous parameters 
have ambiguous effects on the producer price. In the ongoing version, we take into account 
monitoring and enforcement costs to reduce information asymmetry between the players.   
We thereafter make an empirical analysis using survey data collected at farm-level for 181 
households  in  Kenya  to  discover  variables  which  influence  the  efficiency  of  producers. 
Results from multinomial logit estimation show that the age of the household, the plot size of 
green beans and their average yield and access to credit increase the likelihood to produce 
under  contract.  Age  by  reflecting  the  experience  could  also  be  taken  as  a  proxy  of  the 
bargaining power. Large size plots and access to credit also contribute to the strength of 
bargaining power while access to credit could mean the ability to finance compliance costs.  
However, it is worthy to note that the empirical analysis is not a test of the analytical model. 
Rather, it is  a complementary analysis made to know better  what influence the producer 
efficiency before entering in a voice process.    16 
These results may have some policy implications. First, the concept of small-scale farm is still 
very relative. The only size of the farm is not sufficiently informative. We need to know how 
this agricultural area is affected to different crops. The farm size is indeed not statistically 
different from zero while the plot size has a significant coefficient estimate.  
Second, access to credit has the highest marginal effect on the likelihood to produce under 
contract. Then, this variable could be taken as a key parameter in capacity-building of farmers 
groups.  Both public and private actors who intend to help small growers to remain in the 
green bean business must focus on this variable. 
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